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THE PERFORMANCE OF INDEX BASED LIVESTOCK 
INSURANCE: EX ANTE ASSESSMENT IN THE 
PRESENCE OF A POVERTY TRAP 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a new index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) 
product designed to compensate for area average predicted livestock mortality loss in 
northern Kenya, where previous work has established the presence of poverty traps. We 
simulate household-specific wealth dynamics based on a model parameterized using rich 
panel and experimental data from the region. The simulations allow us to investigate 
patterns of willingness to pay for asset index insurance that is imperfectly correlated with 
individuals' loss experience. The bifurcated livestock dynamics associated with the 
poverty trap gives rise to insurance valuation that is highly nonlinear in individual herd 
size. Willingness to pay among vulnerable groups who most need insurance are, on 
average, lower than commercially viable rates but subsidization of IBLI premiums 
appears to offer more cost-effective poverty reduction than direct transfers to the poor.   
 
 
Keywords: Index insurance, asset risk, bifurcated wealth dynamics, nonlinear growth, 
poverty traps, safety net, risk preference elicitation, pastoralists, Kenya 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Index insurance has gained widespread interest in recent years as an instrument for 
reducing uninsured risk in poor rural areas that typically lack access to commercial 
insurance products. These financial instruments make indemnity payments based on 
realizations of an underlying index – based on some objectively measured random 
variable – relative to a pre-specified threshold, the “strike” (Barnett et al. 2008). Index 
insurance offers significant potential advantages over traditional insurance. Because 
indemnity payments are not based on individual claims, insurance companies and insured 
clients need only monitor the index to know when payments are due. This sharply 
reduces the transaction costs of monitoring and verifying losses, while also eliminating 
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the asymmetric information problems (i.e., adverse selection and moral hazard) that 
bedevil conventional insurance. These advantages have sparked considerable interest in 
index insurance for poor regions otherwise lacking formal insurance access (Barnett and 
Mahul 2007).   
 The advantages of reduced transaction costs and asymmetric information 
problems, however, come at the cost of increased “basis risk”, the imperfect correlation 
between an insured’s loss experience and the behavior of the underlying index on which 
the index insurance contract is written. A contract holder may experience losses but not 
receive a payout if the overall index is not triggered. Conversely, the aggregate 
experience may trigger indemnity payments even to insurees who experience no loss.   
Given this tradeoff between basis risk and reduced incentive problems and 
transactions costs, the impact of index insurance on well-being remains unknown, 
especially in the case of index insurance on assets that determine the time path of future 
earnings and welfare. And because index insurance is so new, with limited uptake and 
predictable questions about the quality of the initial contracts, there is no empirical 
evidence yet as to the impact of index insurance on the well-being of otherwise-uninsured 
poor populations. This paper offers some initial, ex ante impact assessment findings 
related to a specific index insurance contract that is scheduled to go on sale in early 2010.  
It also offers an innovative approach to establishing the welfare effects of and willingness 
to pay for asset insurance and demonstrates how the presence of asset thresholds 
associated with poverty traps can affect insurance valuation and performance.  
 The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of east Africa are among the poorest regions 
on Earth, with severe (less than $1/day) poverty rates routinely in excess of 75%.  Given 
meager rainfall and infrastructure, the pastoralist populations who inhabit these areas rely 
heavily on extensive livestock grazing for their livelihood. Recent economic research, 
building on extensive prior ethnographic work, finds that east African pastoralists operate 
in an environment characterized by multiple herd size equilibria characteristic of poverty 
traps (Lybbert et al. 2004, Barrett et al. 2006). The prominent role that covariate climate 
risk plays in driving pastoral poverty traps (Santos and Barrett 2007) and growing 
concern that droughts are driving growing numbers of pastoralists into destitution 
(Sandford 2006, Little et al. 2008),  naturally motivated the recent development of index-
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based livestock insurance (IBLI) against catastrophic herd loss in the northern Kenyan 
ASAL (Chantarat et al. 2009a). These IBLI products are being commercially piloted 
beginning in January 2010. 
Like typical insurance, IBLI compensates for livestock loss. But unlike traditional 
insurance, it only compensates for covariate herd losses that are predicted by the 
historical relationship with remotely sensed Normalized Differential Vegetation Index 
(NDVI) measures; an indicator of vegetative cover widely used in drought monitoring 
programs in Africa. These data are publicly available in near-real time and objectively 
verifiable. Chantarat et al. (2009a) explain the details of the IBLI contract design and 
show that it performs extremely well out-of-sample in insuring against catastrophic 
covariate shocks in this region. In this paper we use household-level panel data to 
simulate the impact of IBLI on Northern Kenyan pastoral households’ welfare dynamics.   
This paper makes several novel contributions to the literature. First, IBLI insures 
assets rather than income. Although the overwhelming majority of the global insurance 
market insures assets through property and casualty, life or health insurance products, 
most index insurance on offer in the developing world focus on replacing lost income, 
typically due to rainfall shocks that affect crop production.  The loss of productive assets 
like livestock potentially disrupts future income processes, not just current earnings.  
Furthermore, in the presence of a poverty trap, shocks that push herd sizes below a 
critical threshold at which herd dynamics bifurcate can have especially severe 
consequences. The point of bifurcation is critical because below this threshold the rate at 
which the livestock asset is depleted due to death loss far exceeds any short run 
possibility of rejuvenating the herd. Thus insurance that effectively protects households 
from slipping into the poverty trap can be of especially high value. Conversely, insurance 
that consumes scarce resources and fails to protect the household from catastrophic 
shocks can do damage. Given these considerations, we evaluate IBLI’s performance 
using a dynamic model rather than the usual static approach employed in the existing 
literature. We show that the effectiveness of IBLI depends on initial herd size relative to 
the bifurcation threshold as well as, to a lesser degree, on household-specific basis risk 
and risk preferences. 
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  Second, rather than modeling performance for a representative agent, as is the 
norm in the extant literature (Skees et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and 
Barnett 2004; Deng 2007), we explicitly study how IBLI performance varies based on 
variation in household characteristics, such as initial herd size, and key basis risk and risk 
preference parameters. And rather than making assumptions about these parameters, we 
estimate them from panel data and field experiments from the area. Contracts that 
perform well for a representative household may not prove effective for the majority nor 
for target sub-populations. We show that to be the case with IBLI. 
Third and finally, household-level simulation analysis allows us to compare the 
outcomes of various subsidization programs and targeting schemes. Our analysis finds 
that IBLI subsidies targeted toward vulnerable-but-non-poor pastoralists create an 
effective safety net by protecting such households from slipping into a poverty trap after 
a drought. This reinforces prior work suggesting that safety net interventions targeting the 
non-poor can reduce poverty in the long run by stemming the rate of inflow into the ranks 
of the chronically poor following a shock (Barrett et al. 2008).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the study 
locations and the data. Section 3 introduces IBLI. Section 4 then describes the dynamic 
model we use in the simulations and introduces the certainty equivalent herd growth rate, 
which we use as a key performance evaluation criterion. Section 5 estimates distributions 
of basis risk, risk preferences and other key household characteristics necessary for the 
simulations. Section 6 reports the estimated IBLI performance and how this varies based 
on identifiable household characteristics. Section 7 estimates households’ willingness to 
pay for the optimal contract and district-level aggregate demand for IBLI. Section 8 then 
explores how alternative approaches to offering IBLI commercially or with safety net 
subsidies affect wealth and poverty dynamics in the system. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. The Study Area and Data 
 
Extensive livestock grazing represents the key livelihood in the northern Kenyan ASAL. 
Pastoralists move their herds in response to spatiotemporal variability in forage and water 
access. Northern Kenya experiences bimodal rainfall, defined by long rains that fall 
5 
March-May, followed by a long dry season (June-September) season, then a short rains 
season from October-December followed by a January-February short dry season. We 
henceforth refer to the March-September period as the LRLD season (for long rains and 
long dry), and the October-February period as SRSD (for short rains and short dry).  
When the rains fail, especially over two rainy seasons in a row, catastrophic herd losses 
commonly ensue. 
 We investigate IBLI performance in Marsabit District, Kenya, for which this 
product was developed on a pilot basis. We use data from four locations – Dirib Gombo, 
Logologo, Kargi and North Horr (Figure 1) – from which we have two complementary 
household-level data sets: panel data collected quarterly from 2000-2002 on around 30 
households in each location by the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research 
Support Program “Improving Pastoral Risk Management on East African Rangelands” 
(PARIMA) project (Barrett et al. 2008), and a separate survey fielded during May-August 
2008 among 42 households in each location (Chantarat et al. 2009c). The latter survey 
included field experiments to elicit risk preferences.  
  Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of the four study locations.1 Dirib Gombo, 
on Mount Marsabit, enjoys relatively higher rainfall and is occupied mostly by cattle- and 
smallstock-keeping Boran pastoralists who also rely on town-based livelihood 
opportunities to complement their meager livestock holdings. Logologo is along the main 
road, with a relatively more arid climate and larger cattle and smallstock herds based on 
transhumant pastoralism. Kargi and North Horr are very arid locations on opposite edges 
of the Chalbi dessert, where camel- and smallstock-keeping pastoralists rely on longer 
distance migrations to cope with greater spatiotemporal variability in forage and water 
availability. 
  Sample households rely on livestock and livestock products for 18-87% of their 
income. Severe poverty is widespread and inversely correlated with herd sizes because 
livestock are the main productive asset owned in the region. As a result, livestock 
mortality is considered the main threat to pastoralists’ livelihood. Households’ seasonal 
livestock loss 2000-2002 (including a bad drought in 2000) ranged from the lowest 
average seasonal rate of 7% in North Horr to a high of 21% in Dirib Gombo. The long-
                                                 
1 All summary statistics are weighted by appropriate stratified sampling weights.  
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term consequence of the 2000 catastrophic drought can be seen in the drastic reduction in 
overall mean herd size from 25 TLU at the beginning of 2000 to 15 TLU at the end of 
2008. Extreme (>20%) herd losses occurred in roughly 20% (10-15%) of seasons in Dirib 
Gombo and Logologo (Kargi and North Horr). These catastrophic losses were typically 
due to covariate shocks related to forage and water availability, while modest losses of 
individual animals were more commonly idiosyncratic experiences (e.g., due to predators 
or injury). 
 
3. Index Based Livestock Insurance 
 
Chantarat et al. (2009a) use a large, repeated cross-sectional household data set collected 
by the Kenyan government at monthly frequency, 2000-2008,  to predict area average 
herd mortality rates, Mˆ , from satellite-based, remotely sensed vegetation index series, 
the normalized difference vegetation index for different locations l and seasons t 
)( ltndvi : )(ˆˆ ltlt ndviMM  . The resulting predicted livestock mortality rate serves as the 
index triggering IBLI indemnity payments for that particular location relative to a pre-
specified “strike” level, *M . The IBLI contract  )(ˆ,* ltndviMM  makes indemnity 
payments  )(ˆ,* ltlt ndviMM  equal to the difference between predicted losses )(ˆ ltndviM  
and the strike *M , expressed as a percentage of the insured herd value,  
  
(1)    0,)(ˆ)(ˆ, ** MndviMMaxndviMM ltltlt   . 
  
 For IBLI to be commercially viable, the insurance underwriter adds a premium 
loading 0a  over the actuarially fair rate – i.e., the rate estimated based on the empirical 
distribution of NDVI – to take into account administrative costs, model uncertainty and 
required profit margins.2 The loaded premium rate for coverage season t and location l, 
quoted as a percentage of total insured herd value, can therefore be calculated as  
                                                 
2 The average premium loading for agricultural insurance contracts is in the range of 30-50%.  See, for 
example, the USDA Risk Management Agency’s or the Farmdoc’s Premium Estimator for available 
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  (2)      )(0,)(ˆ)1()1()(ˆ, ** ltltltltalt ndvidfMndviMMaxaEandviMM  . 
 
The left panel of Table 2 summarizes the predicted mortality index )(ˆ ltndviM  for 
each of the four study locations constructed using the full NDVI series available from 
1982-2008 and the livestock mortality forecasting model developed by Chantarat et al. 
(2009a). The predicted herd mortality indices average 8-9%. The right panel of Table 2 
also shows the actuarially fair IBLI premium rate, which varies across locations due to 
differences in the distributions of predicted herd mortality index. In what follows, we use 
54 seasons of predicted area average herd mortality and the associated fair premium rates 
to evaluate IBLI performance.  
 
4. Analytical Framework 
 
With this simple background on the region, the data and IBLI behind us, we now develop 
a simple dynamic model that accommodates the nonlinear, bifurcated herd dynamics 
previously observed in the region, with a critical herd size threshold typically in the range 
of 10-20 tropical livestock units (TLU)3 (Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak 2004, Barrett et al. 
2006, Santos and Barrett 2007).  This model generates multiple welfare equilibria, the 
lowest of which is associated with a poverty trap. As will be clear, the presence of the 
threshold affects the valuation of IBLI conditional on a household’s current herd size.  
 
4.1   A Stylized Model of Bifurcated Livestock Dynamics  
 
Denote the herd size, in TLU, realized by household i in location l at the beginning of 
season t (and so at the end of season t-1, where seasons alternate within a year between 
LRLD and SRSD) as iltH . Herd dynamics are governed by various stochastic processes: 
the rate of biological reproduction, denoted by iltb
~ , the gross non-biological herd 
                                                                                                                                                 
insurance policies for several states and important grain crops in the U.S. 
(http://www.rma.usda.gov/policies/2006policy.html ; http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/cropins/index.html). 
3 1 TLU = 1 cattle = 10 goats or sheep = 0.7 camels. 
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recruitment rate, ilti
~  (which includes purchases, borrowed animals, transfers in, etc.), the 
gross herd offtake rate, ilto~  (which includes slaughters, sales, transfers out, etc.) and the 
herd mortality rate, iltM
~ . Pastoralists face a subsistence constraint that can be 
summarized as a required seasonal livestock offtake level, cH , that covers the minimum 
consumption required for every household member. In this model, we assume households 
have identical membership structures and thus cH  is the same for each household.   
Herd reproduction, mortality and herd offtake and recruitment decisions also 
depend on the risks inherent in the system. The main covariate component in household 
asset risk is related to rangeland conditions, and so is characterized by the vegetation 
index ltndvi  that follows probability distribution )( ltndvif . This covariate risk is covered 
by IBLI. But each household also faces risks, ilt , drawn from probability distribution 
)( ilth  , that are uncorrelated with the covariate component and therefore uncovered by 
IBLI. This latter component includes mainly idiosyncratic shocks experienced by specific 
households – such as conflict, raiding, predation, accidents, etc. – as well as other 
covariate risk unrelated to range conditions – such as disease outbreaks – although we 
find the latter is relatively small compared to the covariate component. Together these 
processes generate the net stochastic herd growth rate in period t, which nets out herd 
offtake and mortality rates from the reproduction and herd recruitment rates so that the 
seasonal herd accumulation can be characterized by 
                              
(3) ilt
iltltilt
ilt
c
iltiltltilt
iltiltltiltiltiltltilt
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where the stochastic herd size 1
~
iltH  is realized at the end of period t. The reproduction 
and net offtake rates vary with a household’s beginning herd size, iltH . Note that we 
abstract here from modeling each of these livestock reproduction and transaction choices; 
instead we simply calibrate this growth function based on the household-specific 
longitudinal data.  
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The stochastic net growth function (e.g., iltiltiltilt Moib
~~~~  ) defined in equation 
(3) is assumed to be continuous, equal to zero when the beginning herd size is zero and 
bounded from below at zero. Equation (3) thus imply nonlinearities in herd accumulation 
due to the consumption requirement, cH , which imposes a regressive fixed cost rate – 
inversely proportional to the beginning herd size – on the rate of return on livestock asset. 
Given the fixed subsistence consumption requirement, households with smaller herd sizes 
must consume a larger portion of their herd.  Herd decumulation results where net herd 
growth falls below the minimum consumption rate.  
The resulting nonlinearity in net herd growth implies a bifurcation in herd 
accumulation characterized by at least one (subsistence-driven) threshold )(* cHH  above 
which herd size is expected to evolve toward a high-level equilibrium and below which it 
is expected to fall to a poverty trap equilibrium. Equation (3) can therefore be rewritten as 
a nonlinear net herd growth function )(  such that the expected net herd growth 
conditional on herd size bifurcates at the critical herd threshold )(* cHH :  
 
(4)  iltiltltilt HndviH ,,~ 1         where      0)(  iltHE   if  )(* cilt HHH             
                     0)( 
iltH
E   if  )(* cilt HHH  .  
 
 Setting the subsistence consumption level at 0.5 TLU per season per household,4 
Figure 2 illustrates the nonlinear expected net herd growth estimated nonparametrically5 
using observed household herd data (birth, mortality, purchase, exchange, sale, slaughter 
and transfer rates) in 2000-2002 and 2007-2008. This pattern implies the bifurcated herd 
threshold at around 15 TLU per household – consistent with previous findings (Lybbert 
et al. 2004, McPeak 2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Santos and Barrett 2007) – below which 
herds collapse over time toward a stable equilibria of 0 TLU, implying an exit from 
                                                 
4 Previous survey work in this region finds average livestock offtake for household consumption averages 
slightly less than one goat a month (McPeak 2004). According to FAO (1992), five goats (each yielding 20 
kilograms of meat equivalent to 5000 grams of protein) gives an average family of three 46 grams of 
protein per day per individual, nearly the recommended daily intake of 50 grams of protein per day per 
individual. 
5 The function is estimated using Epanechnikov kernel with rule-of-thumb optimal bandwidth. 
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pastoralism.  Above that threshold, herds grow toward a high level stable equilibrium size 
of 55-60 TLU.  
 Household i derives intertemporal utility based on a simplified Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (CRRA) function defined over livestock wealth as 
  
(5)    



 )(),...(
~),...,(~, 1 


  il
t
tt
iltiltiltiltilt HuEHHHHHU                 
               where           
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
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10  iR  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion and  1,0  is the 
discount factor. Because of the direct link between herd and welfare dynamics, the 
certainty equivalent growth rate of stochastic herd dynamics provides a direct household 
welfare measure. Define the certainty equivalent herd growth rate as the constant net herd 
growth rate with respect to the initial herd, iltH , that yields the same intertemporal utility 
as the expected intertemporal utility obtained from the stochastic herd dynamics. 
Specifically, the certainty equivalent growth rate, 
c
il , of the stochastic herd dynamics, 
 T tilH 1~  , can be written as6 
 
(6)    )(~),...,(~),(~,..., 21 iltilTiltiltiltiltiltcililtcil HHHHHHUHHU           
 
Using this formulation, IBLI increases household welfare if it increases the certainty 
equivalent herd growth rate relative to that of the uninsured herd dynamics. Therefore, a 
risk premium growth rate, 
cNI
il
cI
il
c
il    , provides a measure of dynamic welfare 
improvement due to insurance. This measure has general applicability to dynamic welfare 
analysis with respect to any asset insurance.  
The certainty equivalent growth rate thereby provides a convenient measure of the 
intertemporal welfare impact of IBLI given the underlying herd dynamics, in contrast to 
                                                 
6 If 1 , this can be written more generally as ))(~()( iltIiltiltcil HHEUHU   . 
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the existing literature, which concentrates on static impact analysis.7 This is important 
because IBLI performance in the initial insured seasons affects performance in later 
seasons through the reinforcing impact of herd dynamics where growth patterns are 
nonlinear, as in this setting. For example, if IBLI fails to protect household from losses in 
the initial seasons that set it on the herd decumulation trajectory, IBLI’s long-term 
performance could be compromised by the initial herd collapse and ensuing dominant 
herd dynamics.  Because the welfare and growth effects of loss vary depending on where 
in the herd size distribution one experiences loss, standard insurance performance 
measures based on induced changes in outcome distributions will not suffice in this 
setting. 
 
4.2   Managing Mortality Risk with IBLI 
 
IBLI compensates for covariate livestock mortality loss based on the predicted herd 
mortality index in each location, )(ˆ ltndviM . For simplicity, we assume that the 
household insures either all or none of their herd at the start of each season, which 
enables us to compare fully insured herds under several contract specifications against the 
case of no insurance. The insured herd size realized at the end of coverage season t for a 
household in location l can thus be written as 
 
(7)   iltaltltiltltiltciltiltltiltIilt HndviMHHndvigH   ),(~)|,,(~1~ 1  
 
where iltg~  represents the non-mortality component in the net growth rate in (3). 
IBLI thus reduces expected net herd growth in good seasons by the IBLI 
premium, alt , but IBLI should at least partially compensate for losses during periods of 
substantial covariate herd mortality through the indemnity payment, lt . Given certain 
cost and uncertain benefit, the household-specific basis risk with respect to the contract 
                                                 
7 Another approach concentrates on measuring changes in the distribution of the insured outcome based on 
mean-variance measures, e.g., coefficient of variation, value at risk and downside risk measures (Skees et 
al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004). Since that approach ignores the insuree’s 
risk preferences, it may misestimate the benefit of insurance (Fishburn 1977; Breustedt et al. 2008). 
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 )(ˆ,* ltndviMM  is thus a key determinant of IBLI performance. According to (1) and (7), 
basis risk depends on the correlation between the predicted area average mortality index, 
)(ˆ ltlt ndviM , and the individual-specific mortality rate, ),(
~
iltltilt ndviM  . The larger the 
proportion of predictable covariate loss in a household’s individual mortality loss, the 
greater the gains from IBLI. 
We further investigate the basis risk in IBLI by disaggregating the household-
specific mortality rate into a beta representation form of the hedgable predicted mortality 
index. Specifically, household-specific herd mortality ),(~ iltltilt ndviM   is orthogonally 
projected onto the predicted area average mortality index as8   
 
(8)   iltlltltiililtltilt ndviMndviM   ˆ)(ˆ),(~             
      
where 0)( iltE  , 0)),(ˆ( iltltlt ndviMCov   and IVar ililt 2)(   . Here il  reflects 
household i’s long-term average mortality rate, which implicitly reflects household-
specific characteristics that determine their livestock loss (e.g., herding ability),  lˆ  is the 
long-term mean of the predicted mortality index for location l and ilt reflects other losses 
that are not correlated with the covariate component captured by the index.  
This beta representation allows us to identify distinct, interrelated household-
specific basis-risk determinants, ililti  ,, . The coefficient i  measures the sensitivity 
of the household’s mortality experience to the predicted herd mortality index in its area. 
1i  represents the case in which deviations of household i’s livestock losses from its 
long-term average are, on average, perfectly explained by variations in the predicted area 
average mortality index, while 0i  corresponds to the case, where these two series are 
independent. If the household-specific mean mortality il  is relatively similar to the 
location-specific mean predicted mortality rate lˆ , then the closer i is to one, the better 
will the predicted mortality index explain household’s losses, and so the lower the basis 
risk. Pastoralists with i  lower (greater) than one or with il  lower (greater) than lˆ  
                                                 
8 Miranda (1991) and Mahul (1999) also use variant of this specification. 
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therefore tend to over (under)- insure their herd mortality losses using IBLI. The risk 
component ilt  reflects the relative proportion of household’s overall losses that are not 
manageable by IBLI. The greater its variance, 2il , the larger the basis risk.  
Our analytical framework thus emphasizes the standard theoretical result that the 
risk management effectiveness of any IBLI contract specification,  altltndviMM ),(ˆ,* , 
measured by ),,,( iiltiltlt
c
il RHndvi    depends on household-specific variation in these 
key basis risk determinants and risk preferences. A critical innovation with this approach 
is that the presence of a threshold-based poverty trap further implies that IBLI 
performance also depends on household herd size. This analytical framework serves as 
the basis for the estimation and simulation in Section 5. 
 
4.3   Threshold-based IBLI Performance  
 
In order to show analytically how IBLI valuation might deviate from the standard 
insurance evaluation in the presence of bifurcated asset dynamics, we discretize the 
nonlinear net herd growth in (4) into a simple additive form:  
 
(9)        iltiltltiltilt HndviBHAH ),()(~ 1                        with        
          HH
HH
ifn
ifn
HA
ilt
ilt
H
L
ilt 


)(    and   
P
P
yprobabilit
yprobabilit
with
with
ndviB
iltB
iltG
iltlt 


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1
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In (9), )(A  represents the deterministic component of the herd growth rate, which is 
conditional on the initial herd size relative to the critical threshold with 10  L  and 
1H . The relation )(B  is the stochastic component of herd growth written as the sum 
of the insurable covariate component captured by NDVI ( 0G  in a good season with 
probability  )()(ˆ
*
0
lt
M
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( P1 ) and the uncovered component with 0)( iltE  . Assuming, for simplicity, that 
0)1(  BG PP  , this implies the expected herd dynamics: 
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This allows us to derive recursively two stable intertemporal welfare levels: 
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with 10  L  eventually leading those with *HH ilt  into the poverty trap, a long-run 
equilibrium herd size close to zero. 
We consider the expected impact of IBLI when pastoralists can insure all of their 
herds at period t with a contract priced at lt   that pays lt  in a bad season with 
probability P1  and pays nothing during a good season with probability P. Holding risk 
preferences and basis risk determinants constant, we will show that the dynamic welfare 
effect of an IBLI contract varies with initial herd sizes at time t. In particular, four distinct 
cohorts emerge.  
(1) For the first cohort, IBLI cannot alter their herd dynamics.  Their beginning 
herd size is too far beneath the critical herd size threshold to grow past *H  by the end of 
the season since even in a good season and without insurance *)( HH iltGL  . Thus 
IBLI only provides typical insurance in reducing the probability of herd loss during a bad 
season, while the premium payment speeds up herd decumulation during good seasons. 
By (6), the IBLI valuation is the same as that in the standard insurance case without 
bifurcated asset dynamics: 
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So   1111 ))(1()(   iii RRltltBLRltGLcil PP   
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For this cohort, the value of IBLI (reflected in a positive risk premium growth rate) 
depends on the extent to which IBLI imperfectly compensates for the insured’s losses and 
household-specific risk preferences. However, since households in this cohort converge 
to the low-level equilibrium with or without insurance, IBLI offers them relatively little 
in the way of economic relief.   
 (2) The second cohort consists of pastoralists expecting to grow their herds. 
Beginning herd sizes are modestly above *H  and grow if the season is good and when 
they do not pay the insurance premium. However, paying the insurance premium drops 
them beneath *H  so that 1
** )( iltltiltGL HHHH    in a good season. Because 
IBLI shifts down their herd growth trajectory, the risk premium growth rate is effectively 
taxed by  1
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 , as is evident from the certainty equivalent growth rate:  
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The value of IBLI is therefore lower than it would be absent the bifurcated herd 
dynamics, holding risk preference and basis risk determinants constant. 
(3) The third cohort consists of pastoralists with beginning herd sizes slightly 
above but still vulnerable to the risk of falling below *H . IBLI protects this cohort from 
falling below *H  while their herd size remains above *H after paying the insurance 
premium, iltltiltGL HHH   *)( . For them .)()( ** HHHH iltBLiltltlt    
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Since IBLI preserves their herd growth trajectory, IBLI increases their insurance 
valuation relative to the case without bifurcated asset dynamics by the factor  
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  For this reason, the dynamic welfare impact of IBLI for this cohort is  
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 (4) The last cohort consists of pastoralists with herd sizes so large that even 
without insurance they are not expected to fall below the critical herd threshold after 
covariate shocks; .)( *HH iltBH   Thus IBLI would not alter their herd dynamics, 
just like the first cohort (with the smallest herds). But because these larger herd sizes 
have higher expected net herd growth, H , their valuation of IBLI is significantly more 
than those in the first cohort according to  
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    111 )()1()(   iii RRGHRGH PP  . 
 
Overall, cohorts three and four – the wealthier segments of this at risk population – 
represent the main source of demand for IBLI in this setting. The expected threshold-
based performance of IBLI in the presence of bifurcated wealth dynamics mirrors the 
patterns found in Lybbert and Barrett (forthcoming) in a different poverty trap model that 
does not consider insurance options. 
 
5. Empirical Estimation and Simulation 
 
In what follows, we simulate households’ herd dynamics and key performance 
determinants – household risk preferences and basis risk – as a first step towards 
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exploring the effectiveness of IBLI contracts over many sets of seasons, with different 
initial seasonal outcomes.  
The main component in estimating and simulating herd dynamics is the net herd 
growth rate in (3). We estimate the non-mortality component separately from the 
mortality component as we are particularly interested in estimating the key basis risk 
determinants directly from the correlations between individual households’ livestock 
mortality and the location-specific predicted herd loss index that triggers IBLI payout.  
 We first estimate non-mortality component of the seasonal livestock growth 
function in (3) by imposing subsistence consumption of 0.5 TLU per household per 
season. We pool four seasons of herd dynamics data from 2000-2002 and two seasons 
from 2007-2008 under the maintained hypothesis that the expected herd growth function 
is stable across 2000-2008. Kernel-weighted local polynomial regression9 is used to 
estimate two nonparametric relationships between the non-mortality herd growth rates10 
and household beginning TLU herd size conditional on whether the observed season is 
good or bad, as defined by seasonal NDVI data according to Chantarat et al. (2009a). The 
two estimated non-mortality growth functions conditional on the vegetation condition are 
then used in the simulation of herd dynamics. They are plotted in Appendix 1.  
Next, we estimate the relationship between household-specific herd mortality 
rates and the location-average predicted mortality index described in (8). We pool four 
seasons of household-specific mortality rates across the four 2000-2 study locations. A 
linear relationship between deviations of the two from their long-term means is then 
estimated using a random coefficient model with random effects on the slope coefficient, 
commonly known as “beta”.  
This model, estimated by maximum likelihood, allows us to take into account 
variations of slope coefficients across households.11 The estimated slope coefficient 
represents the degree of sensitivity of household’s mortality loss to the predicted 
                                                 
9 Epanechnikov kernel function is used and the optimal bandwidth is chosen according to Silverman’s Rule 
of Thumb. 
10 Growth rates were constructed using observations on births, purchases, borrowing and lending of 
animals, exchanges, sales, slaughters and transfers. 
11 Estimation of models of beta-representation (e.g., the CAPM model in financial econometrics) generally 
rely on the seemingly unrelated regressions model for sector-specific equations, which allows for 
unrestricted error structures (e.g., due to potentially cross-sectional correlations). In our case, we do not 
have enough longitudinal observations of individual households to apply that model. 
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covariate mortality index for their location. Of course there may still be other covariate-
but-unpredicted components, in addition to the idiosyncratic component, in the model’s 
disturbances, which can potentially result in cross-sectional correlation. In an attempt to 
disaggregate these two components in the disturbances, the predicted seasonal household-
specific residual iltˆ  is projected onto its location-specific mean each season lt .12 So the 
model we estimate can be summarized as 
 
(16)    iltlltltiililtltilt ndviMndviM   ˆˆ),(~                 
                             iltltilt e    
 
where lt   represents the covariate component in the unpredicted mortality loss with 
degree of co-variation measured by  , and ilte  represents household’s idiosyncratic 
mortality loss with   0ilteE ,   0jltilt eeE  if ji  , and   IeVar ililt 2 . The estimation 
results, which allow us to estimate household’s basis-risk-determining parameters and 
other key characteristics13 in  iltiiltililti eH ,,,,,  , are reported in Appendix 2.  
We show in Figure 3 the distributions of estimated household betas, as well as the 
unpredicted component of mortality losses, ilt  for these four locations.14 Overall, the beta 
distribution centered around 0.8 with considerable variation,15 ranging from -0.35 to 2 
with a standard deviation of 0.5. The distribution of the mean-zero unpredicted 
component of mortality losses also exhibits high variation, ranging from -0.42 to 0.44 
with a standard deviation of 0.12. This dispersion indicates considerable basis risk in 
IBLI in spite of the product’s very strong out-of-sample performance (Chantarat et al. 
                                                 
12 The intercept for this model is zero by construction. 
13 The overall average herd sizes observed from 2000-2002 and 2007-2008 are used as representatives of 
the beginning herd sizes in the four locations. 
14 Though our estimations and simulations from this point on were location-specific, we report overall 
results. Some location-specific results are reported in the Appendices; the rest can be requested from the 
authors. 
15  Because (16) implies the estimated household beta only with respect to the the hedgeable mortality 
index, this does not have to be centered at one, unlike the estimated household beta with respect to area-
average losses – such as is commonly used in agricultural finance literature for  measuring basis risk 
(Carter et al. 2007; Miranda 1991). 
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2009a), and the potential for significant, predictable variation in performance across 
households.  
We then estimate parametrically the best fit joint distributions, by location, of the 
estimated household-specific characteristics  iltiiltililti eH ,,,,,   using the @Risk 
program, which allows us to specify a correlation matrix that captures pairwise 
relationships between these variables, and the upper and lower limits of the distributions. 
The best-fit distributions were then chosen based on the χ2 goodness of fit criterion. The 
estimation results are reported in Appendix 2.  
Using these estimated distributions, we then simulate herd dynamics of 500 
representative households in each location as follows. For each location, we randomly 
draw 500 combinations of household-specific  iltilii H,,,    from the joint 
distributions – each of which represents a simulated representative household. For each 
simulated household, we then randomly draw 54 seasons of idiosyncratic components of 
mortality loss, ilte , from the location-specific distribution.
16 We also randomly draw 54 
seasons of location-average unpredicted mortality losses, lt , from the values estimated 
according to (16).  
Figure 4 presents the overall cumulative distributions of baseline household herds 
(i.e., without insurance) during various years for these four locations. More than 50% of 
herds collapse toward destitution over time in Dirib Gombo, compared to less than 10% 
in North Horr, reflecting the relatively low beginning herd sizes and high seasonal 
mortality experience in Dirib Gombo relative to other locations. The bifurcated livestock 
growth in the simulated herd dynamics can be shown by simply estimating the 
autoregression in (4) for 10-season (5-year) lags. Figure 5 plots the results, which clearly 
display a critical herd size threshold around 15 TLU.  
We also simulate dynamics for 15 stylized pastoralist households with key 
characteristics, e.g., five different beginning TLU herd sizes  30,20,15,10,5  and three 
levels of beta coefficients  5.1,1,5.0  for each initial herd size. Each is assumed to have a 
long-term mortality rate that resembles the location-specific long-term mean predicted 
                                                 
16 We use the location-specific distribution of ilte  since we do not have enough individual data to simulate 
the individual-specific distributions.  
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mortality index, and a location-specific uncovered risk component. These stylized 
households allow us to better understand how basis risk and initial herd sizes influence 
IBLI’s impact on herd dynamics.  
We are now ready to analyze the effectiveness of IBLI by simply comparing herd 
dynamics with and without IBLI. We construct 54 pseudo sets of 54 consecutive seasons 
from the existing vegetation data letting each observation serve as an initial period once 
in a revolving 54-season sequence with the working assumption that these 54 seasons 
repeat themselves in sequence.17 This allows us to evaluate performance of IBLI taking 
into account different possible initial realizations of stochastic range conditions.  
 We consider five IBLI contracts with five strike levels of five percent increments 
from 10-30%. Households are assumed to insure their entire herd. For each contract, we 
simulate the resulting insured herd dynamics based on (7) using the distribution of 
location-specific seasonal predicted mortality index )(ˆ ltndviM  and the location-specific 
premium rate shown in Table 2.  
 As we compute the value of insurance based on the expected utility approach, the 
certainty equivalent herd growth depends on household discount rates and risk 
preferences. For simplicity, we assume no discounting, 1 . We calibrate household-
specific CRRA parameters based on a simple experimental lottery game run among the 
households in June-July 2008. Our risk elicitation game follows the simple method used 
in Binswanger (1980, 1981); Eckel and Grossman (2002); Barr (2003) and Dave et al. 
(2007). Households were first given 100 Ksh for participating. Then we introduced five 
lotteries, which vary by risk and expected return. Respondents were invited to use their 
100 Ksh to play one of the five lotteries for a real prize, if they wished. If they decided to 
pay 100 Ksh to play, they were then asked to choose their most preferred lottery to play. 
A fair coin was then tossed to determine their prize. Six categories of risk aversion 
associated with six (geometric mean) coefficients of relative risk aversion,{0, 0.1, 0.3, 
0.4, 0.7, 1}, were derived based on households’ choices (Chantarat et al. 2009c). 
Appendix 4 summarizes the results of this risk preference elicitation experiment. For 
                                                 
17 This is a harmless assumption. In essence, the typical burn rate approach to weather insurance evaluation 
assumes that one year is statistically independent of another and that the universe of possibilities is 
contained within the historical timeframe  represented by the data. Thus in probability the likelihood of 54 
seasons repeating in sequence is the same as any other sequence of 54 non-repeating seasons. 
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each location, we then randomly assign each simulated household with one of the six 
CRRA parameters based on the observed wealth strata specific distributions of CRRA.  
 
6. The Effectiveness of IBLI for Managing Livestock Asset Risk 
 
Figure 6 depicts some key patterns of insured herd dynamics, using Kargi and 1  as 
an example. Panels (a) to (e) each reflect the cumulative distributions of uninsured and 
insured herd sizes for a single household over a set of 54 simulated seasons. 
 Panel (a) shows that IBLI does little for pastoralists with a low beginning herd 
size (e.g., 5 TLU). IBLI cannot prevent these households from falling into destitution 
given how far they are beneath the critical herd growth threshold (~15 TLU). Indeed, 
paying an insurance premium each season without offsetting indemnities slightly 
accelerates herd collapse.18  
Varying patterns of IBLI performance emerge for pastoralists with herd sizes 
around the critical herd threshold, i.e., for those whose herd dynamics are very sensitive 
to shocks. Panel (b) represents a pastoralist with an initial herd size of 15 TLU 
immediately at or slightly below the critical threshold. This pastoralist was hit by large 
covariate shocks that so disrupted his asset accumulation that he ended on a de-
cumulating growth path without insurance. But with IBLI imperfectly compensating for 
the losses, decumulation was averted, and the result was a stabilized growth trajectory. 
Because IBLI changes his herd dynamics by insuring against catastrophic collapse, the 
certainty equivalent herd growth associated with IBLI should be relatively high due to the 
added effect of the bifurcated herd dynamics in the system.  
Panel (c) presents the opposite case, in which a pastoralist with the same initial 
herd size of 15 TLU could slowly climb onto the herd growth trajectory during good 
vegetative seasons if he did not pay an IBLI premium.  If his luck holds, he could escape 
the poverty trap without IBLI; the premium payments in this case actually retard 
                                                 
18 Our model assumes away possible indirect benefits of IBLI, such as its potential to crowd in finance for 
ancillary investment and growth. If IBLI crowds in credit access, it may alter the growth trajectory and the 
critical herd size threshold, opening up the possibility that IBLI benefits the least well-off pastoralists as 
well.  Our data do not permit credible parameterization of such shifts, so we abstract from them in this 
analysis. 
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progress. The difference between panels (b) and (c) purely reflect the ex post effects due 
to random draws of seasonal condition and reflect the great value of insurance when it 
proves to have been needed, and also the adverse effects on those who enjoyed a streak of 
good luck. 
Panel (d) presents the case of a pastoralist with 20 TLU, who would be vulnerable 
to shocks that could knock him onto the decumulation trajectory in the absence of 
effective insurance.  Indeed, we see that for vulnerable households just above the critical 
herd size threshold, well-designed IBLI can effectively move them away from the 
poverty trap, substantially lessening the probability of herd size collapse. This is the 
population that benefits most, in expectation, from IBLI. 
Panel (e) depicts the common pattern of IBLI performance for pastoralists with 
large initial herd sizes – e.g., 30 TLU – who face little immediate danger of falling into 
destitution. IBLI contracts provide typical insurance, reducing the probability of herd 
losses, while seasonal premium payments also reduce the chance of reaching extremely 
large herd sizes. This simply reflects the second-order stochastic dominance of the 
insured herd sizes relative to the uninsured. 
The ex ante wealth impacts on IBLI performance shown in Figure 6, however, 
holds constant other household- and location-specific characteristics that determine a 
household’s basis risk exposure associated with IBLI.19 Holding other things equal, 
pastoralists with low (high) beta will tend to over (under) insure their herd losses with 
IBLI, and so they end up paying higher (lower) prices for IBLI that offer unnecessary 
(insufficient) compensation for their losses, on average. IBLI performance should vary 
based on the location-specific distributions of uncovered asset risk and the distributions 
of covariate shocks. On average, IBLI performance will be higher among households 
with lower dispersion of uncovered risk, i.e., less basis risk. In addition, IBLI 
performance is also expected to be higher among households in the locations with a 
higher probability of insurable covariate losses, i.e., greater risk exposure covered by 
insurance. 
                                                 
19 And so it is possible for some pastoralists with as high as 40 TLU to still be vulnerable to shock, and so 
can benefit greatly from IBLI in preserving their growth trajectory. 
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We now consider the performance of actuarially fair IBLI contracts conditional 
on contract specifications and household characteristics. Table 3 reports the change in 
certainty equivalent herd growth rate (also referred to as the positive risk premium 
growth rate) associated with IBLI for 15 stylized households (with individual mean 
mortality fixed at the location-averaged mean predicted mortality index) in each of the 
four locations.20 Various interesting results emerge.  
First, we observe that IBLI performance varies with beginning herd sizes, 
confirming the patterns shown in Figure 6. IBLI gains are negligible for pastoralists with 
the lowest herd sizes (5 TLU) and highest for those with the herd sizes around the critical 
herd threshold (e.g., 15-20 TLU). IBLI does not seem well suited for the poorest herders, 
whose low endowments leave them trapped by the underlying dynamics of the system, 
not by uninsured risk exposure. By contrast, those with marginally viable herd sizes are 
especially susceptible to shocks thus insurance is potentially of considerable benefit to 
them. 
Second, IBLI performance tends to improve as beta increases, holding other 
things equal. This implies that over-insuring tends to have far larger adverse impact on 
herd dynamics than does underinsuring. Indeed, IBLI typically benefits most those with 
beta=1.5 rather than those whose herd sizes tend to move one-for-one with local 
averages. Households with greater-than-average risk exposure (e.g., beta>1) find IBLI 
especially valuable, despite only-partial coverage from IBLI.  
Finally, these simulations suggest that the IBLI contract with a 10% strike level 
outperforms other contracts, on average, even though the 10% strike contract is more 
costly than the others. The greater protection apparently is worth it given the risk of 
falling beneath the critical herd size threshold.  This effect is most pronounced for those 
with initial herd sizes just above the threshold (at 20 TLU), whose vulnerability to shocks 
is best addressed with a low strike insurance contract.   
Having observed how variations in household-specific characteristics could affect 
individual-level IBLI performance, we now explore how the observed location-specific 
distributions of those characteristics affect IBLI performance at a more aggregate scale. 
                                                 
20 For simplicity, Table 3 only reports certainty equivalent results calculated with respect to a CRRA value 
of 0.7. Results for other degrees of CRRA are similar and are available by request. Location-specific results 
are available by request.  
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Table 4 first reports the overall performance of actuarially fair IBLI contracts among 
2000 simulated pastoralists across the four locations. 
The 10% strike contract appears to have the highest performance holding other 
things equal. On average, actuarially fair IBLI contracts with a 10% strike level result in 
a 17% increase in the long-term mean herd size, and a reduction in downside risk of 
12%.21 On average, certainty equivalent herd growth increases only modestly with 
increasing risk aversion.   
In general, effective demand for IBLI (e.g., positive risk premium herd growth 
rate) exists in all locations for IBLI contracts with less than a 30% strike, with the highest 
demand for the 10% strike contract. But not everyone benefits. Figure 7 presents the 
cumulative distributions of the improvement in certainty equivalent growth rates with 
respect to three different IBLI contracts in these four locations. At least half the 
households benefit from an IBLI contract with a 10% strike (slightly lower proportions 
for other strike levels) with the positive risk premium growth rates associated with the 
contract ranging up to almost 100%. The distribution of valuations for the 10% contract 
clearly dominates that of the other contracts in these locations.  
 
7. Willingness to Pay and Potential Demand for IBLI 
 
The preceding analysis offers a glimpse into prospective demand patterns for IBLI.  So 
far, we have explored the performance of IBLI contracts sold at actuarially fair premium 
rates. But an insurer needs to add a commercial loading.  This will change the impact of 
IBLI on herd dynamics by changing the premium paid for insurance. We can use this 
same simulation model to estimate demand for IBLI by searching for the alt  that drives 
the risk premium growth rate to zero. In this section, we explore demand for the 10% 
strike IBLI contract previously shown to have the greatest expected benefit for most 
pastoralists in the region. 
                                                 
21 These two measures are used widely in the mean-variance evaluation approach of agricultural insurance. 
Downside risk reduction is measured by semi-variance reduction of the insured herd dynamics with IBLI 
relative to the uninsured herd.  Specifically, semi-variance of the insured herd dynamics over a set of 
consecutive seasons Tt,...,  , denoted by  T tIilH 1~   ,  relative to some threshold, for example, household’s 
long-term mean herd size ilH   , can be well written as 
2)0,~()~( Iilil
I
ilH HHEMaxHSV il   . 
25 
 We first estimate the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for IBLI of each 
simulated pastoralist by searching for the maximum premium loading )(a  according to 
(2) that still yields a non-negative risk premium growth rate. The expected maximum 
willingness to pay conditional on household initial herd size is then estimated 
nonparametrically across 2000 simulated pastoralists. The average herd-conditional WTP 
is shown in Figure 8, plotted against the observed herd size distribution. 
WTP for IBLI above the actuarially fair rate is only attained at herd sizes of at 
least 15 TLU, just around the threshold at which herd dynamics bifurcate. Since most 
households’ herds fall below the threshold level, this implies limited potential demand for 
even actuarially fairly priced IBLI. Expected WTP increases at an increasing rate for 
those with herd sizes between 15-20 TLU and then continues to increase significantly 
toward its peak at an average 18% loading at the herd sizes around 40 TLU – just below 
the high-level herd size equilibrium – after which there is no statistically significant 
change in WTP as herd size increases. The clear implication is that WTP may not be high 
enough for a commercially viable IBLI absent subsidies. 
Based on these estimated distributions of households’ WTP for IBLI in each 
location, we now study potential aggregate demand. Specifically, we construct a district-
level aggregate demand curve for Marsabit District as follows. Assuming that the 2000 
simulated households in the four study locations are randomly drawn from the total 
population of 27,780 households in 28 locations in Marsabit District,22 we treat each 
simulated household as representing approximately 14 households in the District 
population. We then order the WTP across the population and plot the premium loadings 
(a) against the cumulative herd sizes of the population whose WTP would support 
commercial demand at that loading level. 
Figure 9 displays the estimated aggregate demand curve for IBLI in Marsabit 
District and disaggregates it for each of three herd size groups: (i) the low herd group 
(with < 10 TLU) representing the 26% of the population that currently finds itself on a 
herd decumulation trajectory into a stockless poverty trap, (ii) vulnerable pastoralists 
(with 10-30 TLU) representing the 47% of the population who risk collapsing into the 
                                                 
22 Per the Administrative Census of Marsabit district (1999) produced by Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics and International Livestock Research Institute. 
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poverty trap with the next uninsured shock to their herd size,  and (iii) the better off 
pastoralists (with > 30 TLU) who represent the 27% of population that control most of 
the District’s livestock herd and who, in the absence of an unusually severe shock or 
series of such shocks, should be securely on a growth path.  
Aggregate demand for IBLI seems very price elastic with reduction in quantity 
demanded by 55% as the fair premium rate is loaded by 20%, and a further 26% 
reduction with an additional 20% premium loading. If the commercially viable IBLI 
contract rate is set at a 20% loading, these highly elastic aggregate demand patterns show 
potential aggregate demand of approximately 210,000 TLU in Marsabit District alone. 
These patterns highlight several points. First, large herd owners will be the key drivers of 
a commercially sustainable IBLI product. Second, the apparent price elasticity of demand 
in these locations implies that a small premium reduction (e.g., through subsidization) 
can potentially induce large increases in quantity demanded. For example, as Figure 9 
shows, a decrease in premium loading from 40% to 20% could potentially induce more 
than a doubling of aggregate demand. Third, while IBLI appears most valuable for the 
most vulnerable pastoralists (those with herd sizes around 10-30 TLU) as it could protect 
their herd dynamics from catastrophic shock, most of their WTP lies well below the 
commercially loaded IBLI premium (i.e., at least a 20% loading). This, as we showed in 
Figure 6 panel (c), is due to the possibility that high premium payments will impede herd 
accumulation across the herd growth threshold.  
Premium subsidization may therefore be important if it is socially desirable to 
stimulate IBLI uptake among vulnerable populations. Might IBLI subsidies provide a 
cost-effective and productive safety net in broader social protection programs sponsored 
by governments or donors?  That is the final question we explore using these simulation 
models.  
 
8. Enhancing Productive Safety Nets Using IBLI 
 
In order to investigate whether IBLI subsidies might effectively provide a productive 
safety net for pastoralists in northern Kenya, we first explore herd and poverty dynamic 
outcomes (using an asset poverty line of 10 TLU) of these 2000 simulated pastoralists 
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under four different scenarios: (i) without insurance, (ii) with commercially loaded IBLI 
(assuming a 20% premium), (iii) with an optimally targeted premium subsidization 
scheme that maximizes asset poverty reduction outcomes, and (iv) with comparable, 
needs-based subsidization targeted to the poorest households with less than 20 TLU.  
The targeted premium subsidization scheme is optimized by searching for the 
combination of subsidized premium rates targeted to different herd groups – (a) the 
poorest (<10 TLU), (b) the non-poor likely to fall into poverty in the longer run (10-20 
TLU), (c) the vulnerable non-poor (20-30 TLU), (d) the secure pastoralists (30-50 TLU) 
and (e) the large-scale pastoralists with >50 TLU – that yields the lowest poverty 
outcomes. The results (details available by request) imply that the optimal premium 
subsidization scheme would provide IBLI free to group (b) and at the actuarially fair 
premium rate for the vulnerable non-poor groups (c) and (d), with no subsidization to 
groups (a) and (e). We compare this with two needs-based schemes: subsidized to the fair 
rate %)0( a  and free provision targeted to the less well off pastoralists with herd sizes 
less than 20 TLU.  
In each of these scenarios, the simulated household herd at the end of each season 
reflects the household’s optimal insurance choice – i.e., insure if (induced) WTP exceeds 
the (subsidized) premium rate, do not insure otherwise. Therefore, the herd outcomes for 
the case of strictly commercial IBLI, for example, largely represent the outcomes of the 
insured herds of the well off pastoralists who demand WTP even at commercial rates and 
the uninsured herds of the rest of the population. Figure 10 depicts these herd dynamic 
outcomes in the form of mean household herd size and asset poverty (<10 TLU) 
headcount measures estimated from the 2000 simulated household over the 54 seasons of 
available NDVI data, 1982-2008. 
The commercially loaded IBLI without subsidization, which only attracts a 
majority of the well-off pastoralists, has very limited effect on poverty.  Average herd 
sizes under this scenario closely track the no-insurance case, with only modest increases 
largely among insured, well-off pastoralists partially protected from shocks by IBLI.  
By contrast, under the optimal subsidy scheme, mean herd sizes increase more 
than 80%, relative to the no insurance case, over the course of a quarter century.  
Likewise, the asset poverty headcount decreases slightly over time and stabilizes at a 
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level about 10% lower than without insurance. Subsidized IBLI protects many targeted 
pastoralists herds against collapse beneath the critical growth threshold.   
The most distributionally progressive, strictly need-based schemes achieve less 
than half of these optimal outcomes. While they follow similar (herd size increasing and 
poverty decreasing) patterns, we still observe increasing poverty headcounts even with 
free IBLI for the poorest. This simply reflects the fact that IBLI provides little benefit for 
pastoralists with low herd sizes or with high basis risk exposure. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, allocating scarce resources to subsidize the vulnerable non-poor may do more 
to keep long-term poverty headcount rates down than allocating the same resources to the 
poorest.   
In this simple simulation, the average cost of the optimal targeted subsidization 
scheme, which reaches 20%-50% of the population over 54 historical seasons, is roughly 
$50 per beneficiary per six-month season.23 This implies a $20 per capita cost per one 
percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate, in contrast to $38 for the needs-based 
scheme. An effective safety net can be both cheaper and more effective in stemming 
long-run poverty than traditional transfer programs (Barrett et al. 2008). 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
Covariate livestock mortality is a key source of vulnerability among east African 
pastoralists and often drives households into extreme persistent poverty.  In the presence 
of poverty traps resulting from well-documented nonlinear herd growth dynamics in the 
region, effective risk management becomes potentially important as a means of reducing 
long-term poverty rates.  This paper offers novel dynamic estimates of the welfare effects 
of a new index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product developed to address precisely 
this problem; IBLI is scheduled for pilot sales in early 2010 in northern Kenya.  
 Our analysis adds to the current literature because of our focus on asset risk – 
rather than income risk – and the existence of bifurcated asset dynamics in the northern 
Kenyan pastoral system. These two characteristics require important innovations in ex 
                                                 
23 One TLU is valued at 12,000 Ksh, approximately $160 based on October 2009 exchange rates 
(75.05Ksh/US$). 
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ante impact assessment of insurance. We develop a dynamic simulation model and a 
modified expected utility-based evaluation criterion in order to take into account the 
potential dynamic impact of IBLI. We use  household-level parameter estimates 
including household-specific risk preferences elicited from field experiments as well as 
basis risk parameters estimated from panel data from the region  to explore a) key 
patterns of variation in IBLI performance, b)  patterns of willingness to pay, and c) the 
aggregate demand for IBLI. 
 We find that household initial herd size – i.e., ex ante wealth – is the key 
determinant of IBLI performance, more so than household risk preferences or basis risk 
exposure.  IBLI works least well for the poorest, whose meager endowments effectively 
condemn them to herd collapse given prevailing herd dynamics. By contrast, IBLI is 
most valuable for the vulnerable non-poor, for whom insurance can stem collapses onto a 
trajectory of herd decumulation following predictable shocks. 
We find that a 10% strike contract consistently outperforms higher strike level 
contracts.  District-level aggregate demand appears highly price elastic with potentially 
limited demand for contracts with commercially viable premium loadings. Because 
willingness to pay is especially price sensitive among the most vulnerable pastoralists 
(i.e. those not currently caught in a poverty trap, but on the verge of falling into one)  for 
whom the product is potentially most beneficial, subsidization of asset insurance as a 
safety net intervention may prove worthwhile. Simple simulations find that relatively 
inexpensive, partial subsidization targeted to households with herd sizes in specific 
ranges can significantly increase average wealth and decrease poverty, at a rate of just 
$20 per capita per one percent reduction in the poverty headcount rate.  
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Location
Mean S.D. P(M>10%) P(M>20%) 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Dirib Gombo 8% 8% 28% 9% 2.5% 1.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1%
Logologo 9% 8% 34% 15% 3.4% 1.8% 0.7% 0.1% 0.1%
Kargi 9% 9% 38% 11% 3.3% 1.6% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2%
North Horr 9% 11% 34% 21% 4.3% 2.8% 1.5% 0.7% 0.3%
Contract Strike
Fair Premium Rate (% Herd Value) Predicted Mortality Index 
(M) (%)
Variables/Location
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Climate
Annual Rainfall (mm) 290 185 366 173 297 137 270 115 227 86
Livestock per household, composition and seasonal loss
Livestock in 2008 (TLU) 15 18 2 4 16 22 17 10 25 19
Camel (%) 6% 8% 0% 4% 3% 9% 10% 5% 9% 8%
Cattle (%) 14% 22% 28% 34% 26% 18% 2% 3% 2% 3%
Small stock (%) 80% 21% 72% 34% 71% 19% 88% 6% 89% 9%
Migration (%) 71% 38% 6% 21% 87% 21% 88% 16% 88% 17%
Seasonal livestock loss (%) 9% 15% 3% 8% 15% 22% 5% 6% 11% 15%
Income per capita
Income/day/capita (KSh) 35 89 8 18 32 31 18 28 78 163
Livestock share (%) 59% 40% 18% 31% 61% 35% 87% 24% 67% 34%
Poverty Incedence
Headcount (1$/day) 90% 99% 85% 97% 79%
Headcount (10 TLU) 49% 97% 52% 30% 18%
Statististics from 2000-2002 data (with catastrophic drought in 2000)
Livestock in 2000 (TLU) 25 28 14 10 19 16 40 45 26 16
Seasonal livestock loss (%) 13% 21% 21% 29% 15% 19% 11% 12% 7% 10%
Kargi North HorrDirib Gombo
Overall Location-Specific
Logologo
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 2007-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: % Migration represents the percentage of the household herd that moves at least once over the year. 1 TLU is worth 
approximately 12,000 KSh, equivalent to roughly US$160 based on October 2009 exchange rates (75.05Ksh/US$). Income is 
calculated from the sum of market value of milk and meat production, crop production, livestock trading, business, salary earnings, 
casual labor wage and other petty trading. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of IBLI Contracts (from Chantarat et al. 2009a) 
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Strike
Beta 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
Beginning Herd 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10 -8% 4% 11% -1% 7% 9% -3% -1% 0%
15 18% 24% 40% 8% 14% 23% -1% 1% 5%
20 9% 29% 37% 8% 18% 21% 0% 2% 3%
30 2% 15% 29% 2% 11% 17% -1% 0% 3%
10% 20% 30%
Stat. Beta Beginning L-T Mean Strike Increase Decrease
Herd Herd L-T Mean SV(mean)
(TLU) (TLU) Herd (%) (%) 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.1 Simulated
Mean 0.8 16 33 10 17.4% 11.7% 6.4% 6.3% 6.0% 5.7% 6.1%
Median 0.7 14 31 20 6.7% 7.8% 2.7% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 2.5%
S.D. 0.5 28 30 30 0.2% 0.3% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -0.4%
CRRA
Without IBLI With IBLI
Increase in CER Growth Rate (%)
Table 3: Change in Certainty Equivalent Growth Rate, by Household Parameter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The cell content reflects the certainty equivalent growth rate of the insured herd dynamics minus that 
of the uninsured herd dynamics in percentage terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Simulated IBLI Performance, Four Locations 
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Survey Sites in Marsabit, Northern Kenya
Chalbi
Laisamis
Figure 1: Study Areas in Northern Kenya 
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Figure 2: Nonparametric Estimation of Expected Net Herd Growth Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimated Household-Specific Beta and Non-Drought-Related Mortality 
Rate, Random Coefficient Model (2000-2002) 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distributions of Simulated Herds by Key Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Simulated Herd Accumulation Dynamics, 1982-2008 
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Figure 6: IBLI Performance Conditional on Beginning Herd Size 
(Simulations for Kargi, based on 54 seasons)  
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Figure 7: Cumulative Distributions of Change in Certainty Equivalent Growth Rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Willingness to Pay for IBLI by Initial Herd Size 
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Figure 9: Estimated District-level Aggregate Demand for IBLI  
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Figure 10: Dynamic Outcomes of Alternative IBLI Subsidy Schemes 
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
T
L
U
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Year
No insurance Commercial IBLI (a=20%)
Optimal targeted subsidization Subsidization (a=0%) 
Free provision of IBLI to herd<20 TLU to herd<20 TLU
Mean Household Herd Size
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Year
No insurance Commercial IBLI (a=20%)
Optimal targeted subsidization Subsid ization (a=0%) 
Free provision of IBLI to herd<20 TLU to herd<20 TLU
Asset Poverty Headcount
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
T
L
U
   
41 
 
Good-climate seasons
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
-
.
3
-
.
4
(
%
)
0 20 40 60 80
Beginning herd (TLU) per household
95% CI growth rate
mortality rate
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 3.16, pwidth = 4.75
Growth rate (growth less slaughter and net sales)
 
Bad-climate seasons
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
4
.
6
(
%
)
0 20 40 60 80
Beginning herd (TLU) per household
95% CI growth rate
mortality rate
kernel = epanechnikov, degree = 0, bandwidth = 2.94, pwidth = 4.41
Growth rate (growth less slaughter and net sales)Good Season Bad Season
Non-mo tality component
of growth rate
N n-mortality component
of growth rate
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
-
.
3
-
.
4
(
%
)
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
4
.
6
(
%
)
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
-
.
3
-
.
4
(
%
)
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
-
.
3
-
.
4
(
%
)
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
4
.
6
(
%
)
-
.
4
-
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
4
.
6
(
%
)
Appendix 1: Non-mortality Component of Herd Growth Function  
 
Chantarat at al. (2009a) defines good seasons as those with positive cumulative deviation of NDVI observed at the end of the 
season and bad seasons as those with non-positive cumulative deviation of NDVI. Below we plot the two nonparametrically 
estimated non-mortality growth functions conditional on vegetation conditions, which we use as the basis for the simulations. 
The conditional herd mortality rates are also plotted here to illustrate that during the good seasons, more households enjoy 
positive net growth rates (i.e., mortality rate below non-mortality growth rate), while those above the critical herd size 
threshold of 12-20 animals maintain just slightly above zero growth during the bad seasons. Santos and Barrett (2007) report 
similar findings. 
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Regression of individual mortality on predicted mortality index
Location Variable Obs. Variable
(Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household-specific βi Household-specific non-drought related loss εilt (%)
Dirib ExtValue(0.7,0.6) 20 1.08 0.66 1.05 0.60 (Based on the model estimations) -0.02 0.20 -0.01 0.18
Kargi Logistic(0.7,0.2) 25 0.71 0.39 0.70 0.34 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08
Logologo Normal(1.1,0.4) 27 1.13 0.38 1.13 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.13
North Horr Logistic(0.3,0.1) 22 0.37 0.18 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07
Regression of predicted residual on location averged residual
Location Variable Obs. Variable
(Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household-specific βεi Idiosyncratic loss eilt (%)
Dirib ExtValue(0.6,0.7) 20 1.01 0.77 1.02 0.80 LogLogistic(-1,1,17.7) 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.14
Kargi Normal(1,0.3) 25 1.00 0.27 1.01 0.26 LogLogistic(-0.3,0.3,6.9) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06
Logologo Logistic(1,0.1) 27 1.00 0.26 1.00 0.26 LogLogistic(-1.4,1.4,27.1) 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11
North Horr ExtValue(0.9,0.2) 22 1.01 0.32 1.00 0.29 Lognorm(0.4,0.04,RiskShift(-0.4)) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
Other key household characteristics
Location Variable Obs. Variable
(Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household-specific long-term mean mortality rate μil (%) Houehold's beginning herd size Hilt (TLU)
Dirib Logistic(0.2,0.1) 20 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.11 Lognorm(30.2,9.6,RiskShift(-15.3) 12 10 12 8
Kargi Logistic(0.1,0.02) 25 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 InvGauss(37.5,60.8,RiskShift(-4.3) 33 31 34 29
Logologo Logistic(0.1,0.04) 27 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.06 InvGauss(19.8,33.7,RiskShift(-2)) 18 15 17 14
North Horr Logistic(0.06,0.03) 22 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 Normal(29.6,15.1) 26 17 30 15
Estimated Simulated
Estimated SimulatedEstimated Simulated
Estimated Simulated
Estimated Simulated Estimated Simulated
Appendix 2: Summary of Estimated and Simulated Household Characteristics 
 
   43 
Household-specific mortality rate (%) Milt
Location
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Dirib 0.21 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.20 0.00 1.00
Kargi 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.50 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.95
Logologo 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.74 0.14 0.15 0.00 1.00
North Horr 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.54
Household-specific non-mortality growth rate in (%) gilt
Location
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Dirib -0.05 0.12 -0.22 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.84 0.38
Kargi 0.05 0.07 -0.22 0.22 0.04 0.12 -0.23 0.38
Logologo 0.02 0.10 -0.22 0.30 0.01 0.14 -0.23 0.38
North Horr 0.07 0.11 -0.22 0.22 0.08 0.07 -0.23 0.38
Household-specific herd size Hils
Location
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Dirib 5 8 0 30 6 10 6 16
Kargi 21 39 0 224 20 43 43 38
Logologo 15 17 1 64 16 21 14 23
North Horr 24 32 0 53 24 33 68 37
Beginning 1982-2008
Simulated (1982-2008)
Simulated 
Observed in PARIMA (2000-2002) Simulated (1982-2008)
Estimated (2000-2002, 2007-2008)
Observed (2000-2002, 2007-2008)
Appendix 3: Summary of Baseline Simulation Results 
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Appendix 4: Summary of Risk Preference Elicitation 
 
The left panel of Table A4 presents the gambling choice set with 50% probability of 
yielding either a low or high payoff. The first gamble choice reflects the situation if the 
pastoralist chooses instead not to play the game, i.e., to keep the certain 100 Ksh 
compensation. For gamble choices 2-5, expected returns24 increase by 5 Ksh while the 
risk (standard deviation) increases by 2 Ksh. Gamble choice 6, however, involves only an 
increase in risk with the same expected return as gamble choice. Extreme risk averse 
pastoralists would sacrifice expected return to avoid risk and choose the sure bet (Gamble 
1). A moderately risk averse household would choose an intermediate bet (Gamble 2-4). 
Risk neutral pastoralist would choose gamble choice 5 or 6, which have the highest 
expected returns. A risk seeker would choose gamble 6 in search of a higher potential 
payoff. This experiment was designed to be as simple as possible, while retaining 
reasonable ranges of risk choices.  
Though this simple elicitation method produces coarse categorical estimates of 
risk aversion, they work well compared to more complicated methods, especially among 
subjects with little or no literacy (Dave et al. 2007; Dohmen et al. 2007; Anderson and 
Mellor 2008). We estimate the range of coefficients of relative risk aversion implied by 
each possible choice of gambles under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) according to: 
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1
1
     , ,0)(  PU  10    and k=1,2. 
 
  represents probability of each possible payoff P and R is the CRRA coefficient. In 
each case, the upper (lower) bound of R  can be calculated as the value of R that 
generates same utility level for the payoffs associated with the preferred gamble and the 
                                                 
24 For gamble 2-5, the sample numbers are linearly related to the properties of the gamble in term of 
expected return and variance. The relationship between expected return and variance can be summarized by   .2.0100 SDRE   The gamble number (G) can be written as   192.0  REG . The gamble number is 
therefore a reasonable parametric summary index of risk preference. 
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Cumulative Distribution of CRRA
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Gamble High Low Expected S.D. CRRA Interval Geometric mean Risk aversion class
Choice Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff CRRA
1 100 100 100 0 R>0.99* 1.0 Extreme
2 130 80 105 25 0.55<R<0.99* 0.7 Severe
3 160 60 110 50 0.32<R<0.55 0.4 Intermediate
4 190 40 115 75 0.21<R<0.32 0.3 Moderate
5 220 20 120 100 0<R<0.21 0.1 Low/Neutral
6 240 0 120 120 R<0 0.0 Neutral/risk seeking
less (more) risky adjacent. A value of R є (0,1) reflects a risk averse household.25 The 
value R = 0 is associated with a risk neutral household, while R <0 indicates a risk seeker. 
Following Binswanger (1980), we assign a mean CRRA measures to each of the ranges 
using the geometric mean of the two end points.26 In the case of gamble 6, a value of zero 
is given to the CRRA measure to represent a class of risk neutral or risk seeker. The value 
of one is then assigned to the case of gamble 1 to represent the extremely risk averse 
class. We then assign each household to one of the six risk aversion classifications 
(extreme, severe, intermediate, moderate, low/neutral and neutral/risk seeker). 
Table A4: Summary of Risk Preference Elicitation Set-Up 
 
 
 
* Without assumption of 1R , the actual value of R is 1.67. 
 
Below are plots the cumulative distributions of CRRA associated with each of 
the three livestock wealth strata used in the 2008 survey.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In our setting, we truncated R at the maximum value of 1 as we only consider CRRA class utility 
function that is increasing. Value of R greater than 1 will yield negative value of utility. 
26 For the case of gamble 5 with one of the end point at zero, arithmetic mean was chosen in this case. 
